Abstract A deterministic server is shared by users with identical linear waiting costs, requesting jobs of arbitrary lengths. Shortest jobs are served first for efficiency. The server can monitor the length of a job, but not the identity of its user, thus merging, splitting or partially transferring jobs offer cooperative strategic opportunities. Can we design cash transfers to neutralize such manipulations?
The problem and the punch lines
Dividing the burden of joint externalities raises many issues of incentivecompatibility. One of these is strategic transferring, merging, or splitting of certain private characteristics of the participants. This type of manipulation is discussed in the fair division literature (see details in section 2); here we study it in a simple scheduling problem with transferable utility.
A single deterministic server/machine is shared by users with linear waiting costs, requesting jobs of arbitrary lengths. A job of size x i takes x i units of time to process; an agent's disutility is the waiting time until her job is completed, augmented by a (positive or negative) cash payment selected by the mechanism. The key assumption is that the server can monitor the size of a job, but not the identity of its user. This creates opportunities for manipulation if two agents i, j can costlessly merge two jobs of sizes x i , x j into a single job of size x i + x j , reporting to the server under one of their names; or if agent i can split his job of size x i into two smaller jobs x The key assumption is realistic when the usage of the server/machine is private, and cannot be traced to its actual beneficiary. Think of a tool that agents carry to their private workstation, for instance a software used on a private machine. Protecting the privacy of the users is often a design constraint, e.g., when they share a single "link" (access point to a database or phone line). The needs of each user of the link must remain unknown to the server, who cannot detect if and when the link is used by agent i on behalf of another agent j. Two more factors affect the feasibility of the strategic maneuvers in question. First assuming a false identity should be easy, as is the case in huge networks such as the internet, where protecting the system performance against aliases is an important issue: Douceur [2002] . The second factor is the cost of merging, splitting or transferring jobs: it is minimal if the job produces an electronic document, or uses a physical tool easily transported from one job to the next.
Given identical linear waiting costs and the feasibility of cash transfers, efficiency requires to serve the shortest jobs first. Suppose the server does this and performs no monetary transfers (at least when the efficient scheduling order is unique, i.e., all jobs are of different size). This mechanism is highly vulnerable to splitting: given two real jobs x 1 = 4, x 2 = 3, agent 1 can split his job as x (3, 4, 3) , she will complete x 3 before agent 2 is served, and the net gain $4 can be divided between agents 1 and 3 (we assume a cost of $1 per unit of time). But the merging of jobs can only delay their completion, hence is not profitable.
Consider next a mechanism serving the longest jobs first, thus maximizing total waiting cost. No matter how it deals with ties, this mechanism is badly vulnerable to merging, as well as to partial transfers: simply use the above examples backward. But the splitting of a job is never profitable.
Can we design a system of cash transfers to prevent in all problems single agents from splitting their job, and coalitions from merging them under a single identity? And what about partial transfers of jobs?
Despite the simplicity of our scheduling model, some of the answers to these questions are disappointingly negative. Theorem 1 in Section 4 contains two such statements. If the set of potential users contains at least 5 agents, a mechanism treating equals equally cannot be both merge-proof and splitproof. A continuous mechanism (i.e., net waiting costs depend continuously upon the profile of job sizes) cannot be both merge-proof and split-proof ; it is also vulnerable to transfers involving three agents or more: Section 8.
On the positive side, we show that the family of merge-proof scheduling mechanisms is fairly large, and so is that of split-proof mechanisms: each family contains many efficient mechanisms. We also find that Splitproofness, unlike Merge-proofness, comes at a high normative cost: it is incompatible with several compelling fairness requirements. Proposition 1 in Section 5 gives a precise content to this statement. We restrict attention to efficient mechanisms (serving successively jobs of increasing size) treating equals equally, and continuous. Then every splitproof mechanism must charge a substantial positive fee to vanishingly small jobs, who create no externality; it must subsidize some jobs in the sense that their net waiting cost is smaller than their size x i ; the net cost of agent i cannot be weakly increasing in x i ; the ordering of net costs must sometime contradict that of job lengths; and finally the net waiting cost of a given job is unbounded when other jobs become arbitrarily large. By contrast, merge-proofness is compatible with all properties just described.
In Section 6, we construct a large family of efficient scheduling mechanisms, continuous and treating equals equally, and for which the role of merge-proofness and split-proofness is especially easy to describe. Pick a continuous function θ from R 2 + into R such that θ(a, b)+θ(b, a) = min{a, b} for all a, b. Label the set of users N = {1, 2, .., n} in such a way that x 1 ≤ x 2 ≤ . ≤ x n . The θ-mechanism serves the job in the efficient order 1, 2, .., n, and performs cash transfers resulting in the net waiting cost y i = x i + P j6 =i θ(x i , x j ) for all i. By construction of θ, this implies P i y i = nx 1 + (n − 1)x 2 + ... + x n , so these transfers are balanced.
We call the above mechanism separable because it divides the externality min{x i , x j } between agents i, j independently of other job lengths. Proposition 2 in Section 6 characterizes merge-proof separable methods by a system of inequalities ((4)) slightly less demanding than the super-additivity of θ in its first variable, and split-proof separable methods by a similar system ((5)) slightly more demanding than the sub-additivity of θ in its first variable.
Two separable mechanisms stand out. The first one, called S + , splits the (i, j)-externality equally, namely θ
max{a, b}. The method S + corresponds to the Shapley value of the optimistic stand alone cooperative game (a coalition S standing alone is served before N/S); the method S − to the Shapley value of the pessimistic stand alone cooperative game (a coalition S standing alone is served after N/S).
We find that S + is merge-proof, whereas S − is split proof -hence the latter shares all unpalatable consequences of splitproofness discussed above.
In Section 7 we give a characterization result in which the main requirement is immunity to strategic transfer of jobs involving only two agents, combined with cash transfers within a coalition of arbitrary size (recall that strategic transfers among 3 or more agents are inevitable). We call this property pairwise transfer-proofness. The mechanisms S + , S − as well as their affine combinations y = a · y + + (1 − a) · y − , a ∈ R, meet this property. Theorem 2 characterizes this one-dimensional family of methods . A corollary characterizes the S + mechanism by requiring either that null jobs pay nothing, or that the optimistic stand alone wait be a lower bound on the net cost (x i ≤ y i ).
Related literature
In the fair division literature, the earliest discussion of manipulation by merging, splitting, and transferring, is in the rationing problem, where the sum of individual claims exceeds the available cash. Dividing the money in proportion to individual claims is the only method invulnerable to transfers, as well as to merging or splitting of claims: Banker [1981] . Extensions of this result are in Moulin [1987] , DeFrutos [1999] , and Ju [2003] . The transfer-proofness property appears in the quasi-linear social choice problem (Moulin [1985] , Ermolov [1995] , Chun [2000] ), in axiomatic cost-sharing (Sprumont [2005] ) and more: Ju et al. [2005] offer a unified treatment of most of this literature.
We now review the recent and growing microeconomic literature on scheduling. A familiar extension of our model allows linear waiting costs to vary across participants. A scheduling problem consists of a profile of job sizes x i and waiting costs δ i per unit of time. Agent i 0 s disutility is δ i w i + t i , where w i is waiting time until completion of job i and t i is the cash payment. Minimizing total waiting cost requires to serve the jobs in the increasing order of the ratios Smith [1956] ). The mechanism designer can use the cash transfers to ensure truthful (dominant strategy) elicitation of the privately known waiting costs: utilities are linear in money, therefore Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms can be readily applied: Dolan [1978] , Mendelson and Whang [1990] . Given linear waiting costs, we can choose a budget-balanced (fully efficient) VCG mechanism: Suijs [1996] , Mitra [2001, 2002] . If we elicit job lengths instead of waiting costs, a similar construction is possible (Hain and Mitra [2004] , Moldovanu [2003, 2005] ), provided the VCG mechanisms are suitably generalized to take into account the more complicated allocative externalities from misreporting the size of one's job.
In our model, individual preferences are known to the server, and job size is observable. All the action comes from the inability of the server to detect the true identity of users, and the users' ability to request a job, or part of a job, without revealing its true beneficiary.
Cash transfers are also a simple tool to achieve fairness, namely an equitable sharing of the congestion externality. For the scheduling problem with linear waiting costs, several auhors simply apply off-the-shelf solution concepts like the Shapley value or the core to a relevant cooperative game: Curiel et al. [1989] , [1993] , [2002] , Hamers et al. [1996] . The most popular solution is the Shapley value of the optimistic stand alone cooperative game: Curiel et al. [1993] and Klijn and Sanchez [2002] . It plays an important role in the current paper as solution S + . In the case of identical job sizes, this solution is axiomatized by Maniquet [2003] , while Katta and Sethuraman [2004] suggest alternative interpretations of fairness. The Shapley value of the pessimistic stand alone game corresponds to our second solution S − . With identical job sizes it is axiomatized by Chun [2006] . Chun [2004] al-lows for variable job sizes, extends both solutions to this context and offers parallel characterizations.
The companion paper Moulin [2004] discusses the same strategic maneuvers when the server instead of cash transfers, uses randomization. In that context efficiency places no restriction on the sequencing of jobs. Splitproofness remains a more demanding property than Merge-proofness, yet these two properties are now compatible. A certain probabilistic scheduling rule, the Proportional rule, is characterized by the combination of Mergeproofness, Split-proofness and a couple of natural properties of invariance and fairness.
3
The model
The set N contains all potential users of the simple machine. It may be finite or infinite. A scheduling problem involves a finite subset N of N . Agent i's job is completed in exactly x i units of machine-time. We always assume
, where x ∈ R N ++ , the server must choose the ordering σ of N -the sequence -in which the jobs will be processed, and a vector t ∈ R N of monetary transfers such that P N t i = 0. Each agent incurs a waiting cost of $1 per unit of time until completion of his/her job (a partially completed job is useless). The equality of waiting costs is an important simplifying assumption: see the brief discussion in Section 9.
We write σ(i) < σ(j) to mean that agent i precedes agent j in the ordering σ, and P (i, σ) = {j ∈ N|σ(j) < σ(i)} is the set of agents preceding i in σ. The disutility of agent i given σ and t is
Thus t i is a tax on agent i when t i > 0 and a subsidy when t i < 0. The standard notation a S = P i∈S a i will be used throughout the paper. Because monetary transfers are unrestricted, efficiency amounts to choosing an ordering σ minimizing total waiting cost X
An ordering σ is efficient if and only if it schedules shortest jobs first:
The set of efficient orderings is written E (N, x) . We use the notations a ∧ b = min{a, b}, and N(2) for the set of all non-ordered pairs {i, j} of distinct agents. Then the minimal (efficient) total waiting cost
Definition 1 Given N , a scheduling mechanism µ associates to every problem (N, x), where N ⊂ N and x ∈ R N ++ , a pair µ(N, x) = (σ, t), where σ is an ordering of N, and t ∈ R N with t N = 0. A scheduling method m associates to every problem (N, x) a profile of net waiting costs m(N, x) = y, y ∈ R N , such that
x i , for some ordering σ of N We call the mechanism µ efficient if σ ∈ E(N, x) for all N, x; we call the method m efficient if y N = v(N, x) for all N, x.
To each mechanism µ, we associate a method m by equation (1) . To an efficient method m corresponds essentially a unique efficient mechanism µ : the only qualification is at those problems x where some jobs have the same size, x i = x j , so that E(N, x) is not a singleton.
Our first normative requirement is the standard horizontal equity Equal Treatment of Equals (ETE): x i = x j ⇒ y i = y j for all N, x, i, j All methods discussed below meet ETE, yet this property is not necessary to our main characterization result (Theorem 2). By contrast, the following axiom plays a key role in Theorem 2
Continuity (CONT): x → y(N, x) is continuous on R N ++ for all N Continuity ensures that microscopic variations in the job sizes do not have a macroscopic impact on waiting costs. In particular when x i = x j , a small tremble of x i changing the efficient ordering is fully compensated by the monetary transfers. The benchmark mechanism of the scheduling problem is discontinuous.
Example 1 Shortest Jobs First For every (N, x) where x i 6 = x j for all i, j, the mechanism selects the unique efficient ordering σ and performs no transfers. At other profiles, it performs the minimal transfers required by ETE. If at x we have exactly k agents with x i = a for some a, order them arbitrarily, say i 1 < i 2 < ... < i k , and perform the transfers
The mechanism is defined up to a tie-breaking rule, but the corresponding method is unique:
Example 2 Proportional and egalitarian methods The proportional method equalizes the slowdown
among users
The egalitarian method divides equally the total cost beyond the stand alone cost x i
Both methods meet ETE and CONT. Both are vulnerable to the coalitional maneuvers to which we now turn.
Merging and Splitting
Given N ⊆ N , a coalition S, S ⊆ N, and an agent i * ∈ S, we associate to every problem (N, x) the (S, i * )−merged problem (N * , x * ) as follows
We also use the notation v(S, x) = x S + P S(2) x i ∧ x j for the stand alone waiting cost of coalition S, namely the efficient total wait of S when it is served before N\S. Given a mechanism µ on N we define Merge-proofness (MPF): for all N, S, i * as above and all x ∈ R N ++ :
In inequality (2) the net waiting cost of coalition S before merging is on the left, and its net cost after merging on the right. We assume that the server allocates a slot to a user i, and lets this user use the slot as she pleases: think of user i as renting a machine during her allotted slot. Thus if i * represents coalition S, she will schedule jobs efficiently during her allotted slot of length x S , and each user in S will be able to leave (enjoy her completed job) as soon as it is completed. Note that for S = N, the merge-proofness inequality is just the efficiency property.
We turn to splitting maneuvers. Given N ⊆ N , i * ∈ N, and a finite set T ⊆ N , T ∩ N = ∅, we associate to every problem (N, x), the family of (T, i * )−splitted problems (N * , x * ) as follows
Agent i * 's net cost before splitting is on the left-hand side of (3); after the split, i * must wait until all jobs in P (j * , σ * ) are completed, therefore the right-hand side is his net cost.
To illustrate these definitions, the reader will check easily that Shortest (resp. Longest) Job First is merge-proof but not split-proof (resp. split-proof but not merge-proof).
We check next that the egalitarian method is neither merge-proof nor split-proof. In the problem N = {1, 2, 3}, x = (1, 1, 4), consider the split N * = {1, 2, 3, 4}, x * = (1, 1, 2, 2), in which the actual wait of agent 3 is unchanged, but his monetary transfer decreases:
In the problem N = {1 * , 2, 3, 4}, x = (2, 2, 5, 5) the merging to N * = {1 * , 3, 4}, x * = (4, 5, 5) leaves the wait of agents 1,2 unchanged, but their net transfer de-creases:
We let the reader check similarly that the proportional method is not split-proof, by considering the split of agent 2 from N = {1, 2}, x = (5, 4) into {1, 2, 3}, (5, 2, 2): his monetary charge goes down from 16 9 to 2 3 . On the other hand, the proportional method is merge-proof. We omit the easy proof.
Theorem 1 Assume |N| ≥ 5. There is no scheduling mechanism satisfying Merge-proofness, Split-proofness, and one of Equal Treatment of Equals or Continuity. The proof is in the Appendix. I do not know if the statement still holds true when we drop the assumption ETE and/or CONT.
An alternative interpretation of merging maneuvers is that only the server can operate the machine, and that jobs are delivered only upon completion: think of a standard repair or maintenance service. Then after merging, every user in S must wait until the entire job of length x * i * = x S is completed, thus making merging less attractive. The corresponding incentive property is now Weak Merge-proofness (WMPF): for all N, S, i * and all
It is easy to check that neither Longest Job First nor the egalitarian method is weakly merge-proof. For the latter, consider the merging of agents 1 * and 2 in the problem N = {1 * , 2, 3, 4}, x = (2, 2, 30, 30). Is the incompatibility in Theorem 1 preserved if we replace Merge-proofness by efficiency and Weak Merge-proofness? I do not know the answer to this natural but challenging question.
Unpalatable consequences of Split-proofness
The formal similarity between merging and splitting suggests that the properties MPF and SPF are comparably demanding. This intuition is not correct. We state now five mild normative requirements for a scheduling method, and show below that any "reasonable" split-proof method must violate each one of these five properties. In the following statements, we fix a method (N, x) → y :
The first three properties are standard equity tests. The Stand Alone Bound sets a minimal net waiting cost, namely my disutility in the most optimistic case where I have absolute priority for service. It rules out the subsidization of any agent beyond this most advantageous situation. Ranking is an interpersonal comparison: if my job is larger than yours, I should end up with a larger net cost. Monotonicity says that my net waiting cost weakly increases when the service time of my job increases. Besides its clear normative meaning, this property also rules out "sabotage" by artificial increase of job size: user i increases x i to x 0 i > x i , and leaves the queue only when x 0 i is completed. If the method fails MON, this move can leave her better off. An even more appealing maneuver is to artificially inflate one's job size from x i to x 0 i , make sure that the "real" job of size x i is processed first, and leave as soon as it is finished. This move is plausible under our "rental" interpretation where the server cannot monitor the way the user operates the machine. To guarantee that it is never profitable, we need the following strengthening of MON:
No Charge for Null Jobs means that a vanishingly small job is not taxed or subsidized. It makes sense because this job is eventually served first by efficiency, and causes essentially no additional delay.
Finally, Finite Liability prevents a job of a given size to pay arbitrary large fees when other jobs become very large. It encourages participation of a risk averse user who has no information about other jobs' sizes 1 .
1 See a systematic discussion of the smallest feasible caps on the individual liabilities sup
Many scheduling methods meet the five properties as well as Inflationproofness. Examples include Shortest Job First, the proportional method, and the family of methods identified in Proposition 2 below. Moreover, all six properties are preserved under convex combinations. The egalitarian method fails NCNJ and FL, but meets the other four.
We are ready for the negative result about split-proof mechanisms. By efficiency and CONT again:
Because the split is not profitable for agent 4, and her real wait after the split is unchanged, we have
On the other hand at x = (1, 1, 1, 1) ETE gives y 4 (x) = 2.5, and we see that Monotonicity is violated as x 4 goes from 1 to 2.
Ranking. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and x(ε) = (1, 1, 2(1 + ε)). Consider the split of agent 3 into 3,4 and x * (ε) = (1, 1, 1 + ε, 1 + ε). Mimicking the argument of the proof above we get successively
y(x * (ε)) = (2.5, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5), lim ε→0 t 34 (x * (ε)) = −2, and y 3 (x(0)) ≤ 2
Now efficiency and ETE give y 1 (
. Consider the split of agent 2 into 2,3,4 and x * (ε) = (1, 1 + ε, 1 + ε, 1 + ε). As before we have successively
y(x * (ε)) = (2.5, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5), lim
This contradicts SAB. Zero Charge for Null Jobs. Let N = {1, 2} and fix an integer p, p ≥ 2. Set x(ε) = ( 1 p , 1 + pε) and consider the split of 2 into 2, 3, ..., p + 1 and
. But CONT and ZCNJ imply lim p→∞ y 1 ((
, where a > 0 is arbitrary. Consider the split of 2 to 2, 3, .., k + 1 in x * (ε) = (a, a + ε, .., a + ε). We have lim ε→0 t {2,..,k+1} (x * (ε)) = − k 2 · a, and Split-proofness implies
follows. This proves the claim when |N| = 2. The argument is similar for an arbitrary number of agents.¥ Remark 1 For the statements about Ranking and the Stand Alone bound, the assumption Equal Treatment of Equals is redundant. In other words, any efficient, continous and split-proof method must violate Ranking and the Stand Alone bound for |N| ≥ 4. To check this, take a set N * with four agents. Setting x * (0) = (1, 1, 1, 1), we have y N * (x * (0)) = 10 thus there exists a pair i, j in N * such that y ij ((1, 1, 1, 1)) ≤ 5. Label the agents so that i = 3, j = 4 and N * = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Define N = {1, 2, 3}, x(ε) and x * (ε), as in the above argument about Ranking. Continuity ensures lim ε→0 y 34 (x * (ε)) ≤ 5, then lim ε→0 t 34 (x * (ε)) ≤ −2 Split-proofness applied to the split of 3 in (N, x(ε)) to 3, 4 in (N * , x * (ε)) gives y 3 (x(0)) ≤ 2. Therefore y 12 (x(0)) ≥ 5 so that y i (x(0)) ≥ 2.5 for at least one of 1,2. Thus Ranking fails. The similar proof for the Stand Alone Bound is omitted for brevity.
Separable scheduling methods
The total waiting externality in the problem
A separable method shares each pairwise externality x i ∧ x j independently of the rest of the jobs.
Definition 2 Choose a continuous function θ from R 2 ++ into R such that θ(a, b) + θ(b, a) = a ∧ b for all a, b ∈ R + . The θ-separable scheduling method is given by
A θ-separable method is efficient, continous, and treats equals equally.
The Shortest Job First method is separable, except that the function θ is not continuous:
Neither the egalitarian nor the proportional method is separable. 
Proposition 2 shows that among separable scheduling methods, it is easy to ensure merge-proofness or split-proofness. The former requires θ to be something less than superadditive in its first variable; the latter requires θ to be something more than subadditive in its first variable. The two requirements are incompatible: this results from Theorem 1, or can be checked directly by comparing systems (4, 5) and (6, 7) . Proof For n large enough we get y 1 > y 2 , contradicting Ranking. Thus θ must be monotonic in its first variable. Next we fix a, b, a ≤ b, and apply Ranking to x = (a, b): For n large enough:
contradicting MON. Conversely IPF follows at once if θ is non decreasing in a, and recall that IPF implies MON. Merge-proofness. Fix N, S, i * , x as in the premises of (2) and develop this inequality for our θ−separable method. Compute first t * i * :
Next the definition of θ implies
Therefore inequality (2) amounts to
Check that if θ satisfies (4,5), then (8) holds for all N, S, i * and x. Repeated applications of (4, 5) give
Applying the top inequality to b = x j for all j ∈ P (i * , σ * ), and the bottom one to x j for all j ∈ N\(S ∪ P (i * , σ * )) gives the desired inequality (8). Next we prove that (4,5) must hold if θ meets (8) for all problems and all merging. Consider N = {1, 2, 3}, S = {1, 2}, i
is empty and (8) yields (4). Continuity of θ takes care of the case a 1 +a 2 = b. If a 1 +a 2 > b, P (i * , σ * ) = {3} and (8) gives (5). Split-proofness. We develop similarly inequality (3) for the θ-separable mechanism. First we compute (t * ) T ∪i * in (3). Set T ∪ i * = R and |R| = r, then relabel agents in R as 1, 2, .., r with (
In the split problem (N * , x * ), the total wait of coalition R (if this coalition was truly made of r different agents) is v(R, x * ) + P r k=1 k · x S k where S k contains those agents in N\i * ranked before k and after k + 1 in σ * . In particular for j ∈ S k , (x * ) k ≥ x j ≥ (x * ) k+1 . We can now compute the net cost of R in two ways:
from which we get (t * ) R . Substituting in the split-proofness inequality (3) we get
We show finally that (6,7) is true if and only if (9) holds for all N, i * , T and x. The "if" statement follows easily from applying (9) to N = {1, 2}, i * = 2, T = {3}, x = (b, a 1 +a 2 ) and x * = (b, a 1 , a 2 ). If b ≤ a 1 , a 2 we have S 2 = {1} and we get (6) . For other values of b, S 2 is empty and we get (7). Before proving the "only if" statement, we notice a consequence of (6,7). Fix k, a k , k = 1, .., r such that a 1 ≥ a 2 ≥ .... ≥ a r , and b. Then
Applying this to a k = (x * ) k and to b = x j for some j in S k
Summing up over all j ∈ N\i * gives (9) as desired.¥ Remark 2 By adapting the proof of statement b) one checks easily that a θ-separable mechanism is weakly merge-proof iff for all b, a 1 , a 2 > 0
Two separable methods stand out for the simplicity of their definition and their multiple interpretations. Moreover, they are the backbone of the characterization of transfer-proof methods in the next section.
Definition 3 The S + and S − separable methods are derived from θ + and θ − respectively.
The corresponding net waiting costs and transfers for a problem (N, x) with |N| = n and x 1 ≤ x 2 ≤ ... ≤ x n are:
where we use the notation x {i,j} = P i≤k≤j x k .
These formulas follow easily from Definition 2. The S + method divides equally the externality x i ∧ x j between x i and x j . If x i < x j , agent i is served first and gives a "rebate" 1 2 x i to agent j.
With the S − method, agent i gives a larger rebate 1 2 x j . Notice that for |N| = 2, S − simply equalizes net costs y
x 2 , a fairly reasonable compromise. But for larger sizes of N, the method S − has several unappealing features.
Proposition 3 i) The scheduling mechanism S + is merge-proof, but not split-proof. It satisfies the Stand Alone Bound, Ranking, Monotonicity, Inflation-proofness, No Charge for Null Jobs and Finite Liability.
ii) The scheduling method S − is split-proof, but not weakly merge-proof. It violates the six other properties above.
Proof Check first that the function θ + has the subadditivity properties (4,5), whereas θ − has the superadditivity properties (6,7), implying MPF for S + and SPF for S − . Theorem 1 implies that S + is not split-proof; a simple example is N = {1, 2}, x = (1, 4) , where the split of user 2 to x * = (1, 2, 2) is profitable. To check that S − is not weakly merge-proof, invoke Remark 2 or consider the merging of agents 1,2 in N = {1, 2, 3}, x = (1, 1, 3): their total transfer decreases from 3 to 1.5, whereas their actual wait increases from 3 to 4 (recall that for the weak merge-proofness property, jobs are delivered upon completion of all merged jobs). That S + meets the six other properties listed in i) follows either by direct inspection of the formula for y + i , or by invoking Proposition 2. Note that the liability of job i among the users N with |N| = n is sup x −i y i ((x i , x −i )) = n+1 2 · x i . This is the smallest feasible liability in our model (Moulin (2005) ). Proposition 1 and Split-proofness imply that S − violates all other six properties; this fact can also be checked directly on the formula for y − i , or by invoking Proposition 2. In particular S − has the following "anti-ranking" property:
We conclude with three alternative interpretations of S + and S − .
Shapley value interpretation (see references in Section 2). Given a problem (N, x), the optimistic Stand Alone cooperative game is S → v(S, x) for all S ⊆ N, i.e., the cost of a coalition S is its efficient cost when it is served before the complement coalition NÂS. The Shapley value of the optimistic game is precisely the method S + . Similarly the pessimistic Stand Alone cooperative game is S → w(S, x) = |S| · x N \S + v(S, x) for all S ⊆ N, namely the efficient cost of S when it is served after the complement coalition. The Shapley value of the pessimistic game is precisely the method S − .
Serial cost-sharing interpretation.View the scheduling problem (N, x) as a cost sharing problem with the demand profile x and the cost function C(x) = v(N, x). One checks easily that y + is the profile of cost shares under the serial cost sharing formula of Friedman and Moulin [1999] .
Direct axiomatization. N ote that under S + , the transfer t + i to agent i does not depend upon the length of jobs longer than x i ; whereas under S − , t − i is independent of the length of jobs shorter than x i . In combination with efficiency and equal treatment of equals, these properties are clearly characteristic. In the related yet different problem where all jobs are of equal length but agents have different linear waiting costs, Maniquet [2003] and Chun [2006] characterize respectively the Shapley values of the optimistic and pessimistic cooperative games. The key property is independence of the waiting costs of agents more, or less, impatient.
Transfer of jobs and a characterization result
We consider a manipulation related to merging and splitting, yet more subtle because it involves a partial transfer of jobs. The number of agents remains constant during the transfer, therefore in this section we may assume N = N . Our main result (Theorem 2 below) characterizes the scheduling mechanisms robust against partial transfers of jobs involving only two agents, together with monetary transfers among possibly more agents. This restriction is crucial. In Section 8 we derive an impossibility result when transfers among three agents or more are feasible.
Given N, i, j ∈ N, ε > 0, and two profiles x, x 0 such that x k = x 0 k for k ∈ NÂ{i, j}, we call x 0 an ε−shrink (resp. an ε−spread) of x by i, j if the largest (resp. smallest) of the two jobs is partially transferred to the smallest (resp. largest) job, without altering their relative ordering
Finally the notation ∆(σ; i, j) stands for the set of agents in N that ordering σ ranks between i and j. We are now ready to define the two sides of the transfer-proofness axiom. Throughout these definitions we fix the set N of agents, |N| ≥ 3. Pairwise Shrink-proofness: for all S, S ⊂ N, x
The left-hand side is the total net cost of coalition S before the (job and cash) transfers. We claim that the right-hand side is its total net cost after the job transfer. Suppose i = 1, j = 2 and x
. The real job x 1 will be completed ε earlier than the completion of x 
After the report, the real job x 1 will not be completed when job x 0 1 is done, but only during the service of job x 0 2 . Thus the difference between the wait of the real jobs and that of the reported jobs is
If the set ∆(σ 0 ; 1, 2) is not empty, a spread from x to x 0 introduces the additional waiting time x ∆(σ 0 ;1,2) to the reported waiting time of S at x 0 .
Definition 4
We call the mechanism µ pairwise transfer-proof (PTP) if it is pairwise shrink-proof and spread-proof.
Observe that PTP rules out certain maneuvers by coalitions S of arbitrary size: although the partial transfer of jobs only concerns two agents, other agents in S are involved in cash transfers inside S.
To illustrate Definition 4, note that Shortest Job First, the proportional and egalitarian mechanisms are not pairwise shrink-proof. This is clear for the former. For the proportional pick N = {1, 2, 3}, x = (1, 6, 5) and S = {1, 2} with x On the other hand, it is easy to check that these three methods are pairwise spread-proof. The following θ−separable mechanism is an example violating pairwise spread-proofness:
Set N = {1, 2, 3} and x = (1, 2, 3). Consider the ε−spread by {1, 2} to x 0 = (1 − ε, 2 + ε, 3) with 0 < ε < 1. Inequality (9) for S = {1, 2} reads
Theorem 2 Fix N with |N| ≥ 4. i) Choose two continuous functions, α : R ++ → R and γ : R ++ → R N such that P N γ i (z) = 0 for all z. Define a scheduling method y as follows:
where y + , y − are the methods S + and S − in Definition 2. Any corresponding mechanism is efficient, continuous, and pairwise transfer-proof. ii) Conversely, if a mechanism µ is efficient, continuous and pairwise transferproof, the associated method y takes the above form. The proof of Theorem 2 and of its three first Corollaries is in the Appendix.
The PTP axiom, almost single handedly, captures a fairly small family of scheduling mechanisms. This family contains the affine combinations of S + , S − to which we can add some "constant" γ, where the coefficients of the affine combination and the constant depend only upon x N .
The following property leads us to a one-dimensional family of methods: Scale Invariance (SI): y(λx) = λy(x) for all λ > 0, x ∈ R N ++ Corollary 1 to Theorem 2 Consider a mechanism µ defined as in statement i) by the functions α and γ : i) µ treats equals equally iff γ(z) = 0 for all z. ii) µ is scale invariant iff α is constant and γ is homogeneous of degree 1.
If we combine Continuity, Equal Treatment, Scale Invariance, with efficiency and Pairwise Transfer-proofness, we are left with the one-dimensional line (not interval) of methods joining S + and S − . These methods are all separable, with corresponding functions θ α :
The parameter α is any real number. The method S + obtains for α = 1 and S − for α = 0.
Corollary 2 to
Finally the normative requirements of Section 5 lead to several characterizations of S + .
Corollary 3 to Theorem 2
The mechanism S + is characterized by the combination of efficiency, Continuity, Pairwise Transfer-proofness and either the Stand Alone bound, or No Charge for Null Jobs.
Remark 3. Two additional properties can be used to single out S + . They both place an upper bound on individual net waiting costs, which is the familiar idea of a lower bound on individual welfare. The pessimistic stand alone bound for agent i is simply y i ≤ w({i}, x) = x N . Both S + and S − meet this bound. The unanimity bound for agent i is y i ≤ n+1 2
x i . It is this agent's net cost in a hypothetical problem (N, e x) where all jobs are of size x i . As indicated in the proof of Proposition 3, S + meets this bound, whereas S − violates it, even for |N| = 2. Now S + is characterized by the combination of efficiency, Continuity, Pairwise Transfer-proofness and either {the pessimistic stand alone bound plus the unanimity bound}, or {the pessimistic stand alone bound and mergeproofness}. The proof is in the Appendix.
Transfers among three or more agents
The two benchmark methods S + and S − , and their affine combinations, are not vulnerable to bilateral partial transfers of jobs, but trilateral transfers are a problem.
A simple example with N = {1, 2, 3, 4} illustrates this important point. In the problem x = (1, 1, 8, 3 ) coalition T = {1, 2, 3} rearranges its three jobs as x 0 = (2, 4, 4, 3) . The actual wait of everyone in T is the same at x and at the reported x 0 : in the latter, the slot x 0 1 = 2 is used to complete jobs x 1 and x 2 , whereas the slots x 0 2 = x 0 3 = 4 are devoted to job x 3 . We check that under both S + and S − , the total tax on T decreases from x to x 0 . Equivalently, the tax on agent 4 increases. By Definition 2 under S + at x : t
An efficient and continuous mechanism µ invulnerable to pairwise transfers takes the form described in Theorem 2 for some functions α and γ. In the numerical example above, α(x N ) and γ(x N ) do not change from x to x 0 , therefore µ is vulnerable to trilateral transfers as well. Hence Corollary 4 to Theorem 2 If |N| ≥ 4, any efficient and continuous mechanism is vulnerable to job transfers involving two or three agents.
For the sake of brevity, we do not give a formal definition of profitable transfers of jobs involving 3 or more agents. The definition is notationally cumbersome, and brings no additional intuition beyond that provided by the numerical example above. Notice that the shift from x to x 0 may be interpreted as the combination of merging jobs x 1 , x 2 and splitting job x 3 . This suggests that our first negative result, Theorem 1, is closely related to Corollary 4.
Concluding comment
The equality of waiting costs across agents is an important simplifying assumption in our model. When we allow arbitrary linear waiting costs, the two solutions S + , S − , are easily extended. Chun [2004] offers a characterization of each solution based on a Consistency property. But the interpretation of Merge-proofness becomes problematic in the more general model: which waiting cost will the merged coalition adopt ? On the other hand splitting maneuvers are unambiguous in this context, provided all aliases have the same waiting cost as the true agent; and transferring tactics are similarly well defined. It is easy to check that the extended S + and S − solutions are still pairwise transfer-proof, and the latter is split-proof.
It is not clear whether or not Theorem 2 generalizes to this model.
Consider a problem (N, x) and a coalition S containing i * . Consider the merged problem (N * , x * ) and suppose the position of i * relative to any j ∈ NÂS (determined by the relative size of x S and x j ) is the same as that of any i in S and any j ∈ NÂS (determined by the relative size of x i and x j ). When S merges to i * , the actual wait of any j ∈ S is unchanged, therefore merge-proofness implies t S (N, x) ≤ t * i * (N * , x * ). Similarly when i * , x * i * = x S splits into S, x j , j ∈ S, the actual wait of i * is unchanged, therefore splitproofness gives the reverse inequality on transfers and we conclude t S (N, x) = t * i * (N * , x * ). We will use this argument repeatedly in the proof below.
Step 2 We show that our method for two-agent problems with unequal job sizes,is anonymous, i.e., independent of the name of the agents. Formally, there exists a real-valued function f (a, b) defined for 0 < a ≤ b, and such that for all i, j
Assume first a < b and apply the two-ways argument to {1, 3}, (a, b) and {1, 2, 3}, (
, b). Exchanging the roles of 1 and 2 yields t 1 (a, b) = t 2 (a, b). As these two agents are arbitrary, we conclude that y i ({i, j}, (a, b)) = y k ({k, j}, (a, b)) for any distinct i, j, k.
Apply next the two-ways argument between {1, 4}, (a, b) and {1, 2, 3, 4}, (
The two-ways argument between {1, 2, 3}, x and {1, 2}, x * = (a, b+c) and step 2 give t {2,3} (x) = t 2 (a, b+c) = −f (a, b+c). Repeat the argument between {1, 2, 3}, x and {1, 3}, x * = (a + b, c), to get t {1,2} (x) = f (a + b, c). From t {1,2} (x), t {2,3} (x) and t 123 = 0 the vector t(x) is now computed explicitely. It is convenient to use instead of f the function g defined by f (α, β) = g(α, α + β) for all α, β ≥ 0. We obtain
for all a, b, d such that 0 < a ≤ b, and 2(a+b) ≤ d, and all x = (a, b, d−(a+b)). Suppose ETE is true: (13) implies t 1 = t 2 + a at a triple (a, a, d), i.e.,
The same equation (14) holds under CONT. As f is continuous in both variables, so is g. For a small positive ε, the net waiting cost of agent 1 at (14) follows by continuity.
Step 4 
At a profile x where b = c, ETE or continuity as above gives
We derive finally a contradiction between (14) and (15) . Taking a = b in (15) , and omitting d for simplicity, we get
Taking b = 2a gives similarly g(5a) = 5g(a) − 8a. Finally taking a = 2x, b = 3x in (15) again gives
On the other hand (14) is g(2x) = 2g(x)−x, and implies g(8x) = 8g(x)−12x. A contradiction follows.
Theorem 2 10.2.1 Proof of Statement i
Consider the method associated with the functions α and γ. As a spread or a shrink leaves the sum x N , and therefore γ(x N ), unchanged, we can simply ignore γ while checking PTP. Recall that y + and y − are separable with associated functions θ + and θ − . Thus y = αy + + (1 − α)y − can be written
For fixed b and z, the function a −→ θ(a, b; z) is linear before b and linear after b, and its slope drops by 1 2 at b. In particular, this function is concave. Thus all we need to show is that any mechanism coming from the method y meets PTP.
Consider first S, x, x 0 and ε as in the premises of (10) . Assume without loss of generality x 1 < x 2 and that agent 2 ∈ S transfers ε of his job to 1 ∈ S. As x N = x 0 N , we omit x N in θ(x i , x j ; x N ) and compute the total net cost of S before and after the shrink: x j ) , and the proof of (10) is complete.
Next we consider a spread, namely S, x, x 0 and ε as in the premises of (11) with x 1 ≤ x 2 and 1 ∈ S transferring ε of her job to 2 ∈ S. With the same notation p k as above, we get:
where the concavity argument shows this time p k ≤ 0 and q j ≤ 0. Check first that for any agent i / ∈ ∆(σ 0 ; 1, 2), we have p i = 0 if i ∈ S\{1, 2} and q i = 0 if i ∈ N\S. This is clear because the functions a → a ∧ x i and a → θ(a, x i ) are linear on [0, x i ] and on [x i , +∞[. Next we pick i ∈ ∆(σ 0 ; 1, 2) and suppose first i ∈ S\{1, 2}. We have
If we show q i + x i ≥ 0, the desired inequality (11) will follow from (16) . Recall that on the interval [x 0 1 , x 0 2 ], the function a → θ(a, x i ) has 2 linear pieces connecting at x i and such that the slope drops by 1 2 at x i . Therefore
The inequality q i + x i ≥ 0 follows if
, ensuring q i + x i ≥ 0. This concludes the proof of statement i.
Proof of Statement ii
We fix N, and an efficient mechanism µ meeting CONT and PTP.
Step 1 For all nonempty and proper subset S of N, we write H(S) = {x ∈ R N + |x i < x j for i ∈ S, j ∈ N\S}. We prove the existence of a function g S (a, b) such that
where t(x) is the monetary transfer selected by µ.
For any x ∈ H(S), efficiency of µ implies that σ(x) ranks S ahead of N\S, therefore y S (x) = v(S, x) + t S (x). Given x ∈ H(S), we define the vector x * by
Note that x * is also in H(x). Our first step toward proving (17) is to show t S (x) = t S (x * ). We call two agents i, j adjacent at x if ∆(σ(x); i, j) = ∅. Given x and i, j ∈ S, adjacent at x, consider x 0 obtained from x by averaging x i and
0 is a shrink of x, and x a spread of x 0 , and PTP implies y S (x) = y S (x 0 ) − ε, where ε = 1 2
0 is in H(S) as well, and that v(S, x 0 ) = v(S, x) − ε, because ]x i , x j [ contains no x k , k 6 = i, j.Now y S (x) = v(S, x) + t S (x) and the similar equality for x 0 imply t S (x) = t S (x 0 ). For any x ∈ H(S) such that x 6 = x * , we can find two agents i, j ∈ S, adjacent at x, and average x i and x j without changing t S (x). Thus we construct a sequence x • = x, x 1 , x 2 , ..., by averaging at each step some pair x i , x j where i, j are adjacent at x. This sequence either stops at x * or converges to x * . By construction
By continuity of y S and of v(S, .), we deduce y S (x * ) = v(S, x * ) + t S (x); because x * ∈ H(x), this gives t S (x) = t S (x * ) as claimed. A symmetrical construction, starting from any x ∈ H(S), and successively averaging x i , x j for some i, j ∈ N\S adjacent at x, delivers t N\S (x) = t N\S (x * ) where (x * ) i = x N \S |N\S| if i ∈ N\S and (x * ) i = x i if i ∈ S. Combining this with t S (x) = t S (x * ), and t S + t N\S = 0, we see that t S (x) only depends upon x S and x N\S , and can be written as in (17) for some function g S . Finally x ∈ H(S) implies
and the proof of Step 1 is complete. In the next step we use the following consequence of (17) . If at problem (N, x) we have x j < x i < x k for all j ∈ S and all k ∈ NÂS ∪ {i}, then
. This holds even if S = ∅, by setting g ∅ = 0, and also if S ∪ {i} = N, by setting g N = 0. 
and the claim follows by CONT. Next we apply continuity again at those profiles where two coordinates are equal, and derive a functional equation ( (18) below) linking the different functions g S . In the rest of the proof we use the simplified notation S ∪ {i} = S, i, {i, j} = i, j, etc... Fix S nonempty, and two agents i, j ∈ N\S. Choose also any three a, b, c such that 0 ≤ a < b < c. We construct x and, for ε small enough, x(ε) as follows:
where e i is the i-th unit vector in R N .
For ε small enough and positive, any efficient ordering of N ranks S before j, j before i, and i before the rest. For ε small and negative, the order is
Step 1, we have
By continuity of y i and of g T , for all T , we deduce Finally the continuity argument applies also to the case S = ∅, a = 0 Thus (18) holds in this case as well for 0 < b < d (recall our convention g ∅ = 0).
Step 3 We derive a first consequence of (18)
b for all ∅ 6 = S 6 = N, and all 0 < b < d n (19) Equation (18) for S = ∅, a = 0, gives (19) for S = i, j. Apply (18) next to S = k and a < b, d > nb:
Fix d, let a converge to b, and use (19) for S = k, i and S = k, j to get (19) for S = k, i, j. An easy induction argument, omitted for brevity, concludes
Step 3.
Step 4 We prove that each function g i (a, d) is affine in a, and its slope is independent of i ∈ N. The assumption |N| ≥ 4 plays a key role in this step, and in this one only.
Develop (20) using (19) successively for S = i, j, k, S = k, i and S = k, j. We get
for 0 < a < b and 
Step 5 End of proof
Recall, for any efficient method, any S and any x ∈ H(S), the equation y S (x) = v(S, x) + t S (x). We have just proven that the method y associated with µ, and the method e y = αy + + (1 − α)y − + γ have e y S (x) = y S (x) for all S and x ∈ H(S). Now if all coordinates of x are different, this forces y(x) = e y(x). By continuity the equality holds everywhere on R N + . This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
10.3
Corollaries of Theorem 2
Corollary 1
Statement i is obvious as y + , y − treat equals equally. For statement ii, the "if" part is obvious. To prove "only if," consider x = d · e i , where e i is, as before, the i-th coordinate vector. Compute
Scale Invariance implies y(x) = dy(e i ). Taking the j-th coordinate of this equation for j 6 = i, gives
As j varies in N and γ N ≡ 0, this implies first α(d) = α(1), then γ j (d) = dγ j (1) for all j, as claimed.
Corollary 2
Clearly the component γ(x N ) in y(x) plays no role in the properties of mergeproofness and splitproofness, so we can assume γ ≡ 0 without loss of generality. Observe that the method α · y + + (1 − α) · y − behaves essentially like a separable method with respect to the function
That is to say, the net cost y i (N, x) is computed as y i (N, x) = x i + P N\i θ α (x i , x j , x N ) for all N, i and x. We can then mimick the proof of Suppose next that the method associated with α, γ meets SAB. Apply this property first for x, i such that x i = 0. We get (23) gives γ ≡ 0.
Remark 3
The pessimistic stand alone bound applied to x = de i gives the opposite inequality of (23), hence α(d) ≤ 1 for all d. Mergeproofness, on the other hand, amounts to α(d) ≥ 1 for all d.
Next apply the unanimity bound to any x, i such that x i = 0. We get x i captures, again, the method S + .
